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Abstract
This article discusses the strategies used by the leaders of civil society organisations (CSOs) to cross the boundary between
the field of civil society and the field of the state. Moreover, it examines the implications of this boundary crossing for
post-authoritarian politics in Indonesia. In doing so, it tries to answer two questions: First, what are the strategies used
by CSO leaders in boundary crossing? Second, what are the political implications of this boundary crossing for Indonesia’s
post-authoritarian politics? Using Bourdieu’s field theory as its conceptual framework and drawing on qualitative inter-
views with CSO leaders, this article scrutinises the mobility of CSO leaders in different sectors: agrarian, anti-corruption,
law, and human rights. It identifies two main strategies used in boundary crossing: direct and indirect strategies. Such
strategies tend to be individual rather than organisational. Neither strategy is exclusive; CSO leaders do not limit them-
selves to particular strategies but may combine them and use them simultaneously. Another finding is that, when crossing
to the state field, CSO leaders may increase or reduce their capital, or even lose it. Furthermore, boundary crossing has
several significant implications for post-authoritarian politics in Indonesia: it generates sectoral policies; it creates political
linkages; and finally, it leads CSO leaders to exert political control within the state field.
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1. Introduction
Interactions between state, economic, and civil society
actors are common in countries around the world (Lewis,
2008; Moore, Sobieraj, Whitt, Mayorova, & Beaulieu,
2002). These interactions occur dynamically, with di-
verse forms that are influenced by the political structure
of the state. Authoritarian regimes tend to have antago-
nistic relationships with pro-democracy civil society ele-
ments (Uhlin, 1997), while democratic governments gen-
erally have more open and plural relationships with civil
society elements.
The political changes that have fundamentally trans-
formed Indonesia since 1998 have also informed state–
civil society relations. There has been an awareness of
the need to “use democratic institutions to ensure pop-
ular control over public affairs” (Savirani & Törnquist,
2016; Stokke & Törnquist, 2013). At the same time,
however, the continued predominance of the predatory
elite in Indonesia’s democracy has resulted in “civil so-
ciety actors seeking to influence the government not
only from the margins of civil society but from within
the power centres of political institutions” (Mietzner,
2013). This clearly shows that civil society actors in post-
authoritarian use political endeavours to enter the state
and play a political role within it.
To understand this phenomenon, this article exam-
ines the strategies throughwhich civil society elites cross
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the boundary between the ‘civil society field’ and the
‘state field’ in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Civil society
elites may be identified based on their dominant posi-
tion in the civil society field or in broader social relations,
which they gain by accumulating social, economic, cul-
tural, and symbolic capital. Following the positional ap-
proach (Hoffmann-Lange, 2017), formal leadership po-
sitions may indicate elite status. However, this study is
not concerned with the identification of individual civil
society leaders as belonging to an elite group; rather,
it focuses on the power dynamics of their boundary-
crossing activities.
This theme is interesting to explore, not only be-
cause it expands the discussion of civil society–state
relations, but also because it offers a detailed under-
standing of the civil society organisations (CSOs) lead-
ers’ boundary-crossing activities. Civil society is predom-
inantly perceived as an autonomous field, and CSOs are
often seen as opposed to the state. Nielsen (2012), for
example, showed that “politics is perceived as dirty, un-
principled, dishonest, and corrupt, and thus incapable
of accommodating activists’ moral struggle.” Such a per-
ception is not entirely correct; as Alagappa notes, “the
relations between civil society and the state are dy-
namic, occurring over a broad spectrum, rather than en-
tirely confrontational” (Alagappa, 2004). Brinkerhoff and
Brinkerhoff (2011) have also shown that civil society–
state partnerships may be established during the devel-
opment process; James Ryker, in his categorisation, elab-
orates that state–civil–society relations can take place in
many forms such as autonomous, facilitation, collabora-
tion/cooperation, co-optation, and containment (Ryker,
1995, pp. 208–211).
In Indonesia, some scholars have explored the dy-
namics of civil society-state relations. Lay (2017a, 2017b)
has mapped CSOs political linkages within the policy-
making process; Aspinall (2014) has examined their rela-
tions within the context of political transformation; and
Mundayat, Narendra, and Irawanto (2009) have found
that their relations depend heavily on the strength of
civil society and the effectiveness of governance. In gen-
eral, Philip Eldridge emphasises that relations between
CSOs and the government in Indonesia are generally
pragmatic, characterised by both co-operation and con-
flict (Eldridge, 1996, p. 30). From these studies, it can be
seen that the relations between the state and civil soci-
ety are complex.
Nonetheless, few studies of civil society–state re-
lations in Indonesia have examined how actors cross
the boundary from the civil society field to the state
field. This practice, known as ‘boundary crossing’ (Lewis,
2008), is relativelywidespread around the globe. As polit-
ical systems transform from authoritarian to democratic,
civil society actors are driven to cross boundaries (Abers
& Tatagiba, 2015; Lewis, 2008; Mietzner, 2013; Perdana,
2015). Studies that have considered this phenomenon
are limited to efforts to explain CSO actors’ motivations
for boundary crossing (Mietzner, 2013) and the charac-
teristics of the practice itself (Lewis, 2008). The current
article seeks to fill this gap by elaborating upon the strate-
gies used by the CSO leader when crossing boundaries.
In describing boundary–crossing practices, the article
answers two main questions: First, what are the strate-
gies used by CSO leaders in boundary crossing? Second,
what are the political implications of boundary cross-
ing for post-authoritarian politics in Indonesia? I find
that, in post-authoritarian Indonesia, two main strate-
gies are used by civil society elites in boundary crossing:
first, ‘direct strategies,’ wherein civil society leaders be-
come politically engaged as candidates in election pro-
cesses; second, ‘indirect strategies,’ wherein civil society
elites follow a zig–zag route into the state. In this sec-
ond strategy, civil society leaders do not follow a singu-
lar route into the state. They may move from subfield
to subfield, strengthen their relationships with other
CSOs, or become involved in political processes as vol-
unteers. Boundary crossing has several implications for
post-authoritarian politics: It generates sectoral policies,
creates political linkages, and leads CSO leaders to exert
political control within the state field.
This article’s examination of leaders’ boundary-
crossing strategies focuses on those involved in the agrar-
ian, anti-corruption, law, and human rights sectors at
the national and local level. These sectors were chosen
based on a review of the literature and discussions with
experts. These processes also become a point of depar-
ture to identify in each sector how civil society lead-
ers cross over to the state field. Data were collected
through in-depth interviews with CSO leaders, political
party actors, and local officials, aswell as two focus group
discussions. Complementary data were collected by re-
viewing related documents. In data collection, multiple
aspects were considered, including the personal back-
ground of CSO leaders, career, experience in civil so-
ciety field, motivation to enter the state field, aspects
that facilitated the process, evaluation of boundary-
crossing experience, etc. The research was conducted
in Yogyakarta, Makassar, Kupang, and Jakarta between
October 2018 and July 2019 as part of a collaboration be-
tween Lund University, Sweden, and Universitas Gadjah
Mada, Indonesia. The research was conducted at both
the national and regional level, as both are important
to consider in the decentralised political environment of
post-authoritarian Indonesia.
In describing the boundary-crossing strategies of
civil society elites, the article presents both a general
overview and illustrative cases. After assessing extant
studies of boundary crossing as a general practice, this
article offers a specific elaboration on the Indonesian
case. It presents the history and political context of bor-
der crossing, two main strategies, and the implications
of the practice. The article also offers a brief compara-
tive analysis in its last section, showing the similarities
and differences between boundary-crossing practices in
Indonesia and other countries.
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2. Boundary Crossing: An Overview
Civil society is often understood as distinct from the
state, and this implies that a boundary exists between
them (Rosenblum& Lesch, 2011). In essence, this distinc-
tion is rooted in particular assumptions, norms, ideolo-
gies, and epistemologies about civil society and the state.
The liberal tradition, for example, has viewed civil soci-
ety as independent from the state; this view is rooted in
liberal regulative principles that position civil society as
an independent, self-regulating, and autonomous asso-
ciational space. In such a view, the state only serves to
promote a pluralist associational life.
However, this boundary is not impermeable; civil so-
ciety and the state are dynamically related. In this con-
text, Chandhoke (2001) argues that “civil society cannot
be defined as entirely separate from the state, as these
fields are intertwined and mutually related.” Alagappa
(2004), examining civil society in Asia, finds that civil
society–State relations occur on a broad spectrum and
are incredibly diverse.
In this dynamic state–civil society setting, boundary-
crossing practice has a political significance to elaborate.
Mietzner (2013), in a study of a CSO activist, identifies
several types of boundary crossers: (1) those who delib-
erately use CSOs as stepping stones to enter the state
field, (2) those who remain with their CSOs when politi-
cal opportunities are lacking, but immediately enter the
state field when it is possible, and (3) those who cross
for ideological reasons and seek to improve the political
system from within. Mietzner notes that CSO actors may
also be active in an intersectional space, not joining po-
litical parties or becoming part of the bureaucracy, but
still advising government ministries and legislative bod-
ies. Actors in such intersectional spaces may be identi-
fied as employing indirect strategies, not contesting elec-
tions but still using their capital to shape policy as ex-
pert staff or advisors. In such situations, activists touch
upon the state field, even as they remain active within
civil society.
Within post-authoritarian states, boundary crossing
can also be seen as a consequence of the permeabil-
ity of the state–civil society boundary. While authoritar-
ian states reject criticism and repress civil society, post-
authoritarian ones are open and accommodative. In such
situations, the state is not situated solely as an object of
monitoring and criticism, but also as a strategic partner
thatmay facilitate the realisation of goals and enactment
of change (Abers & Tatagiba, 2015). Seizing this momen-
tum, CSO leaders may decide to take part in the formal
power structure rather than continue to struggle outside
it (Abers & Tatagiba, 2015).
The above-discussed studies contribute to a clear un-
derstanding of the structural setting of civil society–state
relations as well as their dynamics. However, they have
yet to reveal an important dimension of these relations:
CSO leaders’ ability to cross boundaries and enter the
state field. As such, this article seeks to examine the
practice of boundary crossing, with particular focus on
its strategies.
3. Field Theory and Boundary Crossing
This article’s exploration of leaders’ crossing to the state
field refers to Bourdieu (1986, 1989, 1996), particularly
his concepts of ‘field,’ ‘capital,’ and ‘habitus.’ Field refers
to the gaming space within which power relations occur.
In the field, agents mobilise or organise their available
capital and utilise it strategically to access specific posi-
tions (Bourdieu, 1986, 1989, 1996; Swartz, 1997). This
article uses the field to refer specifically to civil society
(including the networks between civil society actors) and
the state (including the networks between political ac-
tors). The state field refers to the political spaces inwhich
social agents can make political decisions (such as pol-
icy); as such, the basic logic of the state field is its au-
thoritative ability to make a political decision. In this ar-
ticle, the state field encompasses the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches. Conversely, the civil society field refers
to the social space that is mobilised by the logics of as-
sociation, self-organisation, advocacy, and social empow-
erment, which is ultimately distinguished from the state
field by its lack of authoritative force tomake policies and
political decisions.
The concept of field cannot be separated from the
concept of capital, as capital is the main resource that
enables actors to act and compete within the field
(Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu identifies four types of cap-
ital: social, economic, cultural, and symbolic. Following
Bourdieu’s concept, the capital used by CSO leaders to
cross boundaries to the state field may be identified
as networking (social capital), funding (economic capi-
tal), knowledge accumulation (cultural capital), and sym-
bolic capital.
As a practice, boundary-crossing is not only deter-
mined by agents’ ability to mobilise capital within the
field but also by their habitus. As stated by Bourdieu,
“practice is produced through the interaction of dis-
position (habitus) and position within the field, as de-
termined by capital possession” (Bourdieu as cited in
Maton, 2008, p. 50). Using this framework, it can be
recognised that boundary-crossing practices reflect the
habitus of CSO leaders and are made possible by their
ability to mobilise capital.
Drawing from Bourdieu’s field theory, this article
analyses the strategies employed by CSO leaders to cross
into the state field. Leaders’ strategies are influenced by
the habitus and the capital available to them, their ability
to utilise it, and their environment—i.e., the dominant
political system.
In this article, ‘boundary crossing’ is understood as
CSOs leaders’ movement from the civil society field to
the state field. Such crossing may occur directly, through
the contestation of legislative and executive elections, or
indirectly, through zig–zagging from subfield to subfield
(i.e., from human rights to anti-corruption) within the
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civil society field before entering the state field. Referring
to the model offered by Lewis (2008), the former is a
‘consecutive model’ through which CSO elites directly
cross boundaries by moving from civil society to the
state, while the latter is an ‘extensive model’ wherein
CSO elites do not fully cross boundaries, but only ‘span’
them, being simultaneously involved in civil society and
state activities.
4. Boundary Crossing in Indonesia
4.1. History and Political Context
State–civil society relations in Indonesia have dynamic
historical roots. In the early years of independence, con-
siderable antagonism existed within the state field—the
main field of power. This condition affected the dynam-
ics of civil society. As Aspinall remarked, “civil society be-
came a mechanism, not for generating civility and social
capital, but rather for magnifying socio-political conflict
and transmitting it to the very bases of society” (Aspinall,
2004, p. 62).
Political intrigue and bloodshed soon brought
Indonesia into a dark period, one in which political space
was strictly controlled and a logic of authoritarianism per-
meated every aspect of Indonesian society. This regime
identified itself as the New Order and employed a range
of depoliticisation strategies. First, it used an ‘arche-
politics’ strategy in a communitarian attempt to define
and organically structure homogeneous social space.
President Soeharto was constructed as a father figure, as
a source of order and harmony. Second, the regime used
a ‘para-politics’ strategy, seeking to mitigate political con-
flict by way of formulating clear rules. This was reflected
in the New Order’s fusion of political parties, allowing
only two parties and one functional group to exist. Third,
it used an ‘ultra-politics’ strategy, using militarisation to
promote depoliticisation (Duile & Bens, 2017).
The authoritarian regime’s consolidation of power
had a direct effect on civil society actors’ relationship
with the state and their ability to enter the state field.
In the early years of the New Order (1966–1974), sev-
eral civil society activists were able to cross into the state.
These activists, known collectively as the “Generation
of ‘66,” had been staunch opponents of the Sukarno
government’s authoritarian regime (Noor, 2010, p. 22;
Uhlin, 1997, p. 102). However, as the New Order regime
became increasingly authoritarian, civil society became
subordinated. State–civil society relations became in-
creasingly antagonistic in the 1980s and 1990s, and civil
society leaders could no longer penetrate the state field.
Reformasi (Indonesia’s political reform), which be-
gan in 1998, resulted in the opening of political spaces
through democratisation. It created and multiplied
democratic spaces in both the national and local arenas
(Lay, 2017b), enabling CSO actors to become more heav-
ily involved in politics. In the early years of Reformasi,
several civil society leaders became key drivers of re-
form; however, most civil society actors were floating,
being vulnerable and lacking capacity to enter the state
arena. They were what political scientists termed ‘float-
ing democrats’ (Priyono, Prasetyo, & Törnquist, 2003).
In the post-authoritarian era, which remains plagued
by fundamental problems such as weak political rep-
resentation and limited ability to penetrate the state,
efforts have been made to repoliticise civil society ac-
tors through a process known as ‘go politics.’ Five ma-
jor strategies have been employed: (1) forming pres-
sure groups, (2) entering parliament, (3) utilising political
parties, (4) establishing alternative political parties, and
(5) entering government networks (Samadhi & Törnquist,
2016, p. 116; Törnquist, 2009).
Entering parliament and participating in elections
has been a favoured strategy for go politics in civil so-
ciety, as noted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences
(Ichwanuddin, 2010) in its study of civil society actors’
use of the 2009 national and local elections to enter the
state. According to Mietzner (2013), 37 (7%) of the leg-
islators elected in 2009 had a background in activism.
In 2013, the Power, Welfare, and Democracy Project
recorded that such strategies had created linkages be-
tween CSO actors, political parties, and populist politi-
cians (Törnquist & Samadhi, 2016).
However, CSO actors have not only crossed into the
political field through elections; they have also used indi-
rect routes as a means for exerting political power. This
involves a ‘zig-zagging’ process through which CSO lead-
ers move from one subfield to another before entering
the state field. This indirect strategy creates an extensive
model of boundary crossing, meaning that CSO leaders
not only fill new positions within the state field but also
retain a certain position in the civil society field.
To obtain a specific understanding of the two strate-
gies mentioned above, we must examine their use in
boundary crossing in more detail.
4.2. Direct and Indirect Strategies
CSO leaders who enter the state field come from various
subfields but share similar views of civil society’s posi-
tion in post-authoritarian Indonesia. To advance reform,
they must involve themselves in the state. As stated by
TetenMasduki, a CSO leader active in the anti-corruption
subfield:
Good people should be pushed to enter govern-
ment, to become directors general, to become re-
gents, mayors, or even members of parliament. Civil
society actors must enter the government so they can
become champions, pioneers, and promote reform.
That must be a priority. (Teten Masduki, interview,
June 27, 2019)
A similar attitude was expressed by CSO leaders who
were active in the agrarian subfield, who argued that
agrarian reform is a political agenda that must be priori-
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tised by the state. For example, Usep Setiawan, a CSO
leader active in this subfield, stated: “I would say that
agrarian reformmust be promoted by the state. The gov-
ernment, as the administrator of the state, must handle
such reform” (Usep Setiawan, interview, June 27, 2019).
A similar view was expressed by Iwan Nurdin, an-
other CSO leader, who stated: “Agrarian reformmust nec-
essarily involve political processes. We must recognise
that agrarian reform is not a non-political issue. It has
been political from the beginning” (Iwan Nurdin, inter-
view, June 27, 2019).
These shared motives have driven the CSO leader to
cross boundaries. They have sought to reach beyond civil
society and have broader effects on society. If referring
to Bourdieu, “the boundaries of a field can be recognised
based on its influences” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992),
then the practice of boundary crossing can be seen as an
effort to expand their influence to another field.
As explained previously, two strategies are com-
monly used by civil society leaders for boundary crossing,
reflecting the different channels and mechanisms used
by civil society leaders. ‘Direct strategies’ are marked by
a reliance on electoral mechanisms to enter the state
field, while ‘indirect strategies’—though more varied—
share the common feature of zig-zagging from subfield
to subfield.
4.2.1. Direct Strategy
One common strategy used by civil society leaders to
cross over to the state field is the direct strategy, so
named as civil society leaders rely on elections to cross
boundaries. In the direct strategy, civil society leaders ac-
tively engage as candidates in electoral contestation.
Civil society leaders’ use of direct strategies to enter
the state field must be positioned within the context of
post-authoritarian politics, particularly the transforma-
tion of the national, provincial, and district parliaments
through the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. Under
the New Order government, parliament merely served
as a rubber stamp for the executive branch. However,
since Reformasi, parliament has become a new space
for national politics and policymaking (Lay, 2017b, p. 7);
as such, political parties have taken a strategic role in
policymaking and political processes. At the same time,
the mechanisms through which parliament functions
have changed and the political climate has becomemore
open, allowing civil society actors to take a more active
role in parliament (Lay, 2017b).
To obtain a detailed understanding of how civil soci-
ety leaders use elections to enter the state, it is neces-
sary to understand how their ‘habitus’ and ‘capital,’ as
well as their ability to organise andmobilise capital, influ-
ence their ability to cross boundaries. Civil society lead-
ers’ habitus reflects theway they think and act, providing
a basis for their boundary-crossing practices.
The habitus of civil society leaders is strongly linked
to their experiences, as well as the knowledge that
guides their practices. Two key habitus provide a founda-
tion for civil society leaders’ use of elections for bound-
ary crossing: the empowerment experiences that inform
their society-orientated practices, and the experiences
that underpin their advocacy logics. Both provide a foun-
dation for enabling civil society leaders to enter the state.
As mentioned by Sofia de Haan, a civil society leader in
Kupang (Yayasan Alfa Omega), East Nusa Tenggara:
I think that, if we stay outside of the system and
not within it, it will be difficult for us. Even though
we’ve already established a basis for empowerment.
They (the people) can be involved in policymaking
processes at the village level. However, they lack in-
fluence. As such, the decision to become a member
of the local parliament was made to advocate their
rights. (Sofia de Haan, interview, April 25, 2019)
A similar logic provided the foundation for the bound-
ary crossing undertaken by Tomy Yulianto, a civil society
leader from Bulukumba Regency. As he said:
I spent nine years in East Kalimantan, did my best
to create change in society and improve the system.
I spent too long away from home. All of my experi-
ences, all of the knowledge I obtained over the course
of my journey. I should use my competencies to help
my hometown. That’s what made me decide to enter
parliament. (Tomy Yulianto, interview, April 20, 2019)
If advocacy and empowerment are the logics that under-
pin boundary-crossing practices, what enables civil soci-
ety leaders to enter the state through elections (which re-
quire political parties)? As often noted, political parties in
post-authoritarian Indonesia lack public trust, and as such,
they are frequently criticised by civil society activists. It is
thus difficult to imagine how the habitus of civil society
leaders can be in-line with the habitus of political parties.
To understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to
consider the logic used by political parties when recruit-
ing civil society actors. A study of civil society actors con-
ducted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (2010)
found that they are not recruited through a ‘transac-
tional logic’; in other words, economic exchange is not
the central logic through which candidates from civil so-
ciety backgrounds are recruited. Rather, parties require
a symbolic means of showing their concern for voters.
Manor (2013) calls this ‘post-clientelist’ politics, that is, a
politics made up of political connections in which politi-
cians and parties opt to cooperate with well-reputed
leaders and civil society organisations. There is thus no
logical contradiction involved in boundary-crossing prac-
tices. As emphasised by Sofia de Haan:
The party’s main consideration is quality. CSO actors
know the roots of the problems, are capable of re-
vealing needs. Now more CSO actors are involved in
political parties, and many of them succeed. Several
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have become council members. Parties recognise that
CSO actors have constituents and are involved in their
communities. Furthermore, certain leadership quali-
ties are recognised by parties. (Sofia de Haan, inter-
view, April 25, 2019)
As with habitus, capital plays a central role in civil so-
ciety leaders’ choice of direct strategies. The knowl-
edge and networks that they accumulate provide them
with capital that they can utilise to penetrate the state.
Cultural capital (i.e., knowledge) and social capital (i.e.,
networks amongst the grassroots) determine two things
in boundary-crossing processes: first, these leaders’ posi-
tions within political parties and their electability in the
election process.
Sofia’s experience provides an interesting example.
An activist and leader with the Alfa Omega Foundation,
an NGO actively promoting economic empowerment
and rights fulfilment for farmers, fishermen, and the
poor, Sofia had significant bargaining power when deal-
ing with political parties. Owing to her background as
an activist, as well as her recognition as an activist, she
could not only empower others but also influence pol-
itics. Sofia’s capabilities were buttressed by the knowl-
edge that she had accumulated through organisational,
training, and educational activities at the national and
international levels. At the same time, she enjoyed sig-
nificant social capital. The daughter of a priest, she had
been active in church activities throughout East Nusa
Tenggara; this provided her with significant capital in
Christian-majority Kupang, and granted her recognition
at the grassroots level and in the government.
These types of capital provided a foundation for
Sofia’s bargaining with political parties, as a result of
which she became elected to the Kupang Regency
Parliament. Becoming the chairwoman of the Nasdem
Party’s Kupang branch, she was ultimately re-elected in
2014 and 2019. In this case, we can consider that cultural
capital, togetherwith other capitals, can help agents gain
positions in multiple fields.
Other civil society actors chose a different route
when entering the state through electoral processes. For
example, Tomy Yulianto employed a double track ap-
proach when penetrating the state, first being elected to
parliament before gaining a central position within the
executive branch.
In the first track, Tomy Yulianto used his cultural and
social capital to become a member of the local parlia-
ment, becoming the Deputy Speaker of the Bulukumba
Regency Parliament. In the second track, he used his civil
society networks and the symbolic capital that he had
accumulated as Deputy Speaker to become vice-regent.
After crossing over into the state (within the legislative
branch), he used his position to reinforce his social capi-
tal and gain greater recognition:
Many community activists andmedia groups usedme
as a reference, and so people said that I was a media
darling. For instance, when disagreements emerged
between the local government and parliament, I’d be
asked to comment. As I often interacted with the me-
dia, and with my civil society allies in Bulukumba, I be-
came more widely known. (Tomy Yulianto, interview,
April 20, 2019)
This broad recognition provided Tomy Yulianto with sig-
nificant capital, and other CSO activists ultimately urged
him to run for executive election: “I had never thought
of becoming deputy regent and contesting the elec-
tions. However, many youths and media actors—who
had never known me before—shared the same vision.
There thus emerged discourse that I should contest the
election” (Tomy Yulianto, interview, April 20, 2019).
Several conclusions may be drawn regarding the use
of elections as a direct strategy for boundary crossing.
First, actors’ habitus, advocacy orientation, and empow-
erment activities provide a logical foundation for their
boundary crossing practices. This foundation is neces-
sary not only because it shapes civil society leaders’ ac-
tions, but also because it provides a basis for establish-
ing links with political parties and entering the state field.
Second, CSO leaders’ cultural and social capital, including
their networks, provide a basis for their participation in
political parties and electoral processes. Such actors do
not necessarily limit themselves to parliament; they may
also employ a double track, using the legislative branch
as a stepping stone for entering the executive branch.
4.2.2. Indirect Strategy
CSO leaders have not only relied on direct strategies to
enter the state field; indirect strategies have also been
used. Such strategies enable CSO leaders to improve
their knowledge while expanding their networks with
civil society actors and politicians. They are involved in
political processes to a certain extent, such as serving as
candidates’ campaign staff.
Indirect approaches involve a lengthy process
throughwhich CSO leadersmove fromone subfield to an-
other, zig-zagging closer to the state field while remain-
ing within the civil society field. Although they are all mo-
tivated to become part of the post-authoritarian state,
CSO leaders vary in their use of capital and approaches.
Generally, indirect strategies are used by CSO lead-
ers who cross the boundary to the state while remain-
ing active within civil society. Such strategies may involve
movement between subfields, or the expansion of net-
works between them. Suchmobility does not necessarily
guarantee that CSO leaders can accumulatemore capital;
theymay also lose existing capital.Mobility ismadepossi-
ble by leaders’ knowledge accumulation and networking
activities. The experiences of CSO leaders such as Teten
Masduki can illustrate this process. TetenMasduki began
his CSO career as a human rights activist under the au-
thoritarian New Order government, an experience that
enabled him to accumulate significant knowledge regard-
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ing authoritarian regimes and understand Indonesia’s fu-
ture political trajectory. As he stated in an interview with
CNN, he chose tomigrate from the human rights subfield
to the anti-corruption subfield because he recognised
that the authoritarian regime would soon collapse. In its
wake, it would leave a legacy of corruption. As he stated:
“The authoritarian New Order regime was built on vio-
lence and corruption. I saw that, even if the regime was
replaced, these two problems would remain in the gov-
ernment. That is why I established Indonesia Corruption
Watch” (Teten Masduki as cited in Fauzie, 2020).
By becoming an anti-corruption activist, Teten
Masduki lost the symbolic capital of public recognition
as a human rights activist. At the same time, however,
he accumulated new capital: knowledge of corruption
and broad media networks (made possible owing to the
issue’s high profile). He was thus often interviewed by
the media, and over time this enabled him to gain public
recognition as an anti-corruption activist.
With this recognition, Teten was able to establish
networks with politicians and anti-corruption activists.
His conversion of symbolic capital to social capital sig-
nificantly influenced his boundary-crossing activities. He
used his capital to become a member of Joko Widodo’s
campaign staff during the 2014 presidential election,
where hewas able to link politicians with anti-corruption
activists to advance their shared interests. Several ac-
tivists became part of the new government after Joko
Widodo was elected.
An indirect strategy was also employed by Kanti, a
CSO leader who migrated from the human rights sub-
field to the anti-corruption subfield. Drawing on this ex-
perience, she became a member of the legal staff at the
Ministry of the Environment and Forestry. When she mi-
grated, she lost her social capital (i.e., her networks with
marginalised peoples). As she stated:
The Legal Aid Institute (LBH) is a subfield that worked
closely with the poor and the marginalised, while
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) is an elitist sub-
field, as it deals with issues that directly affect political
elites. Where LBH deals directly with those who are
truly powerless, both in terms of their finances and in
terms of their bargaining power, ICW deals with cases
that are very elitist. (Kanti, interview, May 7, 2019)
Although Kanti lost her social capital, her experiences
with anti-corruption activism enabled her to accumulate
new knowledge and become broadly known as dealing
directly with corruption. In 2018, recognising her capac-
ity as a lawyer, the Ministry of the Environment and
Forestry recruited her to its legal staff. According to Kanti,
“this institution required someone who could deal with
corruption issues” (Kanti, interview, May 7, 2019).
Boundary crossers may also expand their networks
with those in power, thereby enabling them to reinforce
their social capital and penetrate the state field. Such
an approach has been used by the CSO leaders in the
Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA, a CSO that pro-
motes agrarian reform). Usep Setiawan, one of KPA’s
leaders, was made the chairman of the Land Committee
at the National Land Office (BPN) in 2006 owing to
his close relationship with the Brighten Institute, led
by Joyo Winoto. This organisation worked closely with
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and when Joyo
Winoto was appointed director of BPN he involved sev-
eral of his allies.
With the end of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s pres-
idency, leaders such as Usep Setiawan used a differ-
ent strategy to enter the state field, establishing close
ties with Joko Widodo’s campaign staff. By doing so,
they were able to ensure that their political networks
were maintained; at the same time, they guaranteed
that they could continue to exert political influence. This
can be seen by the inclusion of several KPA leaders in
JokoWidodo’s government through the Presidential Staff
Office (KSP).
In their boundary crossing activities, KPA leaders
used a unique approach. Even after entering the state
field, they remained active in civil society. Indeed, they
used their boundary crossing activities to expand their
influence in civil society. In other words, this approach
has involved ‘boundary spanning.’
Based on these cases, it may be concluded that CSO
leaders do not enter the state field through a singular
channel, but rather a lengthy process. Three important
processes are used in the indirect strategy: first, moving
to another subfield within the civil society field before
entering the state field, through which civil society lead-
ers accumulate more social and cultural capital. Second,
moving to another subfield while broadening their polit-
ical networks by establishing political links by being ac-
tively engaged in electoral processes as campaign staff;
third, establishing networks with civil society organisa-
tions that have political links with the ruler and are ac-
tively engaged in political processes.
5. Political Implications of Boundary Crossing
The involvement of civil society in policymaking is the
main characteristic of post-authoritarian politics, with
the implication that such involvement can promote the
creation of political linkages and democratic spaces (Lay,
2017a, 2017b). This strategic role in ensuring popular
control over public affairs enables CSOs to become polit-
ical entities with a representational function in a demo-
cratic state (Törnquist, 2009).
CSOs have continued to debate the question of CSO
actors’ involvement in the state.Many civil society actors
have doubted their ability to play a representative role
in formulating domestic policies and agendas. However,
this study has shown that CSO leaders can—to a certain
degree—drive sectoral changewhen they have a position
within the state field. Furthermore, they can create polit-
ical linkages with CSO actors outside the state field. In
several cases, these leaders’ habitus within the state re-
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mains strongly influenced by the habitus created through
their civil society experiences, and this enables them to
play a control function in policymaking processes.
Such sectoral changes are inexorably linked with CSO
leaders’ backgrounds before entering the state field. For
example, CSO leaders with a background in agrarian is-
sues tend to focus on agrarian policy. One such group has
continued to influence agrarian policy since first gaining
influence under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
However, as one activist admitted, their ideas of agrarian
reform sometimes lose their spirit in translation (Usep
Setiawan, interview, June 27, 2019). Another CSO leader
who has promoted sectoral change is Tomy Yulianto,
whose background as an environmental activist focused
on issues of empowerment and agrarian law has in-
fluenced his activities in the legislative and executive
branches. He has, for example, passed local bylaws recog-
nising customary societies, promoting corporate social
responsibility, and regulating agricultural land. Such an
emphasis on sectoral issues, however, has one funda-
mental shortcoming: Sectoral agendas are built upon a
logic of difference, and as such CSO leaders often fail to
develop broader political alliances.
Aside from promoting change through public policy,
CSO leaders also seek to control policymaking processes.
This indicates that their habitus does not change signif-
icantly when entering the state field. This can be illus-
trated through the case of Tomy Yulianto, who was capa-
ble of rejecting the annual Accountability Report of the
Regional Executive; as he said, “Such an event had never
happened in the history of Bulukumba Regency” (Tomy
Yulianto, interview, April 20, 2019).
Finally, CSO leaders who enter the state have an im-
portant role in developing political linkages with groups
or organisations outside the state field. Such linkages
are often established as part of sectoral policymaking
and advocacy.
6. A Comparative Sketch of Boundary Crossing:
Experiences in Indonesia and Other Countries
It is important to note that boundary crossing does not
happen exclusively in Indonesia, and as such a compar-
ative sketch is necessary to understand the similarities
and differences in boundary-crossing strategies around
the world. In Brazil, for example, Abers and Tatagiba
(2015) found that CSO activists have used the state arena
to conduct ‘institutional activism.’ David Lewis (2008),
an important figure in boundary-crossing studies, pro-
vided a detailed examination of boundary crossing in
three countries: the Philippines, Bangladesh, and the
United Kingdom. These countries have fundamental dif-
ferences. In the Philippines, boundary crossing has oc-
curred as a result of the political transition from author-
itarianism to democracy. As such, its boundary-crossing
processes have been more political. In Bangladesh, con-
versely, boundary crossing has been driven primarily by
the state’s own inability to provide public services and
by CSOs’ strategic influence (resulting in part from their
foreign funding). Consequently, boundary crossing has
taken a different direction, with actors moving from the
state to civil society. In the UK, boundary crossing has
occurred as a result of transformations in domestic in-
stitutions and stronger international development pro-
grammes. At the domestic level, the state has created col-
laborative schemes and partnerships with other sectors,
particularly CSOs in the social services. To strengthen
its role as an international donor, the Department for
International Development has created space for CSOs
to become involved in the fund management.
Boundary-crossing practices in Indonesia are similar
to those in the Philippines, both in their context and in
their nature. CSO actors have been driven to enter the
state field; similarly, boundary-crossing activities are po-
litical, with CSO actors being driven to enter politics by
democratisation. However, there are significant ideologi-
cal differences between the Philippines and Indonesia. In
the Philippines, boundary crossing is facilitated by strong
ideological links and roots between CSO and political par-
ties. Such a phenomenon is not present in Indonesian
CSO activists’ boundary-crossing practices.
Boundary-crossing practices in Indonesia also dif-
fer significantly from those in Bangladesh. In Indonesia,
the state has a strong position. The state becomes a
space into which CSO actors eagerly move. Although
Indonesian CSO activists receive significant assistance
from foreign donors, the State is still irreplaceable. As
such, in Indonesia, actors leave CSOs to enter the state,
while in Bangladesh they abandon the state to enter
civil society. Boundary crossing in Indonesia also differs
from the practice in the United Kingdom, as it has not
resulted from the rearrangement of social service pro-
grammes and because Indonesia is not a donor country
(i.e., its CSOs cannot be involved in international agen-
das). The lack of international dimensions significantly
distinguishes Indonesian CSOs from their brethren in the
United Kingdom.
7. Conclusions
CSO elites may cross boundaries and enter the state field
by using ‘direct and indirect strategies.’ In the former,
leaders use elections to gain the access and authority
necessary to directly influence policymaking. In the lat-
ter, meanwhile, elites make a ‘zig-zag’ movement be-
fore entering the state field. In the direct strategy, ac-
tors’ habitus, advocacy orientation, and empowerment
activities provide a logical foundation for their boundary-
crossing practices. This logic is necessary not only be-
cause they shape civil society leaders’ actions, but also
because it provides a basis for establishing links with po-
litical parties and entering the state field. Moreover, a di-
rect strategy is also made possible by CSO leaders’ cul-
tural and social capital, such as their knowledge and net-
works. These provide a basis for CSOs’ participation in
political parties and electoral processes. Finally, in this
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strategy, such actors do not necessarily limit themselves
to parliament; they may also employ a double track, us-
ing the legislative branch as a stepping stone for entering
the executive branch.
When using indirect strategies, CSO leaders do not
enter the state field through a singular channel, but
rather a lengthy process. These leaders’ approaches to
entering the state field vary, but inexorably involve pro-
cesses of capital gain and loss. The indirect strategy may
take one of three forms: first, by moving between sub-
fields within civil society before entering the state field;
second, bymoving to another subfieldwithin civil society
and then expanding political networks by actively engag-
ing in political processes such as elections (i.e., by provid-
ing loyal support to politicians as campaign staff or volun-
teers); third, by broadening networkswith civil society or-
ganisations that have strong political links with the ruler.
Although CSO leaders may use direct and indirect
strategies to cross boundaries, election processes re-
main crucial. We can see that several CSO leaders, even
when not engaged as candidates in elections, actively
serve as campaign volunteers. These activities provide
them with important momentum for creating political
contracts with politicians and entering and influencing
the state.
Boundary-crossing processes also transform civil soci-
ety leaders. Direct strategies transform them into politi-
cians or state officials, while indirect processes offer
them the ability to expand their influence, becoming not
only civil society leaders but also special staff with a
strategic role in state institutions. These new roles en-
able them to influence post-authoritarian political pro-
cesses, and although they cannot entirely transform po-
litical structures, they can still promote some significant
changes. Boundary crossers generally promote sectoral
policy agendas, based on their backgrounds and experi-
ences. Boundary crossers from the agrarian subfield, for
example, continue to promote agrarian reform. At the
same time, they establish political linkages and shape
public policy.
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